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THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH AND 
SAFETY STANDARDS:  
DELEGATION OF REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY IN THE SPS AGREEMENT 
OF THE 1994 AGREEMENT 




INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS 
Previous research has shown that international organizations do not 
necessarily operate or act as intended by the states that created them.1 Why 
then would states delegate regulatory authority to international organizations? 
I examine this question theoretically, drawing on principal–agent (P-A) theory 
and conceptualizing international delegation as a particular form of 
institutionalized cooperation. Explaining international delegation thus requires 
an analytically prior explanation of international cooperation. Empirically, I 
focus on the delegation of standards-setting authority in the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which is 
an integral part of the founding treaty of the World Trade Organization 
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 1. E.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999). See also, e.g., MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA 
FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 
(2004); DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins et al. 
eds., 2006). 
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(WTO), negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 
States should be particularly hesitant to delegate standards-setting in the 
realm of SPS standards since these standards are often the technical basis for 
politically sensitive health and (food and consumer) safety regulations. Indeed, 
setting sanitary standards to protect human and animal health from risks arising 
from additives, toxins, diseases, and disease-carrying organisms and setting 
phytosanitary standards to protect plants from similar risks used to be 
predominantly a domestic issue. In recent years, however, we have witnessed 
what one might call the globalization of SPS standards and standards-setting. 
SPS standards-setting today takes place, in large part, in three international 
organizations—the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the International 
Office of Epizootics (OIE), and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC)—which have a global membership of 171, 169, and 161 countries, 
respectively. This change has occurred mostly as a consequence of the SPS 
Agreement, which delegates standards-setting functions to these three 
international organizations.3 
This delegation of regulatory authority is the focus of this article. Since 
readers may not be familiar with the SPS Agreement, Part II provides a sketch 
of the main provisions and significance of the Agreement and an account of 
how it came about in the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations of the 
GATT. This empirical sketch leads to two analytical questions: Why did the 
contracting parties of the GATT decide to cooperate on SPS standards? And 
why did they select delegation as the means to achieve this objective? Parts III 
and IV analyze these questions theoretically and empirically. I derive possible 
answers from a political-economy approach in the liberal tradition of 
International Relations theory, which emphasizes cost-benefit analyses, 
diversity of interests within states, and issue-specific bargaining power to 
explain cooperation.4 Based on this logic, the decision whether to delegate 
 
 2. See discussion infra Part II. The successive multilateral international trade agreements, 
collectively referred to as “the GATT,” were negotiated in a series of multiyear negotiations known as 
“rounds.” See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 73–74 (2d ed. 1997) (providing an overview of the eight 
GATT rounds concluded to date). The Uruguay Round was the eighth such round. The SPS 
Agreement was accompanied by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), 
which covers all non-SPS regulations, but the focus here is only on the SPS Agreement, since the two 
agreements were negotiated separately and in part involved different interests. 
 3. In addition, many developing countries started well prior to the Uruguay Round to adopt SPS 
standards that had been developed domestically by the United States and other large developed 
countries. However, that change occurred primarily as a consequence of the globalization of product 
markets and constituted itself “merely” the internationalization of a few countries’ domestic standards. 
See generally INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert O. Keohane & Helen V. 
Milner eds., 1996) (addressing the distinction between internationalization and globalization). 
 4. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); HELEN V. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM: GLOBAL 
INDUSTRIES AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1988) [hereinafter RESISTING 
PROTECTIONISM]; Helen V. Milner, International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths 
and Weaknesses, 44 WORLD POL. 466 (1992). 
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should be a function of the costs and benefits of delegation, which leads me to 
build on P-A theory to explain international delegation. In Part III.C, I derive 
alternative (not necessarily strictly competing) hypotheses from the Realist and 
constructivist traditions in International Relations theory. 
Part IV analyzes cooperation and delegation empirically. The foremost 
objective of the SPS Agreement was the liberalization of agricultural trade, 
which was particularly contentious between the United States and the 
European Community (EC) and had been a key demand of developing 
countries for the Uruguay Round.5 The empirical analysis therefore focuses on 
the United States, the EC, and developing countries. Broad-based agreement 
on the desirability of international cooperation allowed for an early decision in 
favor of harmonization and the presumption of GATT/WTO compliance for 
“international [SPS] standards.”6 This decision, in favor of cooperation in 
general, is well explained by a rationalist political-economy account but also 
appears to have been facilitated by the widespread belief in the legitimacy of 
international harmonization. P-A theory then proves very useful for 
understanding government preferences as to whether to delegate regulatory 
functions to specialized international bodies outside of the GATT/WTO 
structure. In addition, normative constraints arising from prior commitments on 
the part of the EC—and the arguably misguided development discourse among 
developing countries—help explain the outcome. 
This article makes three main contributions. First, P-A theory has recently 
become very popular in the analysis of world politics.7 That literature has 
developed largely independently of the broader theoretical debates in 
International Relations and generally treats the analytical decision to draw on 
P-A theory as independent of the core assumptions of the major schools of 
thought in International Relations.8  I seek to increase the usefulness of P-A 
theory for the study of international relations by situating it more explicitly in 
the literature on international cooperation and by showing deductively how P-
A theories of delegation are related to the broader schools of thought in 
International Relations. I demonstrate that much of P-A theory rests on 
assumptions that are consistent with the liberal tradition in International 
 
 5. I use the acronym EC throughout this article to refer to the European (Economic) Community, 
which remains a legally distinctive part of today’s European Union (which itself did not yet exist during 
most of the Uruguay Round negotiations). 
 6. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
 7. E.g., Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund 
Conditionality, 57 INT’L ORG. 551 (2003); DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 1; Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the 
European Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99 (1997); Mark A. Pollack, Learning from the Americanists 
(Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 200 (2002); Jonas Tallberg, 
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and With What Consequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 
23 (2002). 
 8. But cf. Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: 
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 243–45 (2003). 
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Relations theory, which takes domestic politics seriously; but P-A is 
incompatible with core assumptions of some of the other major approaches. 
Second, I provide an empirical analysis of an important case of delegation of 
regulatory authority in the international political economy, based on recently 
released documents from the Uruguay Round negotiations and interviews with 
most of the key negotiators of the SPS Agreement. This case study shows the 
usefulness and some limitations of the P-A approach for understanding the 
international delegation of regulatory authority. Third, I seek to contribute 
substantively to the literature on nontariff barriers (NTBs), which by many 
estimates now exceed tariffs in importance as restrictions on international 
trade. The WTO SPS Agreement is one of the most ambitious attempts to deal 
with NTBs through international cooperation; yet no history or thorough 
analysis of the SPS negotiations has been written.9 Although a comprehensive 
history of the SPS Agreement is beyond the scope of this article, I provide a 
first analysis of the negotiations that led to those elements of the Agreement 
that involve international delegation. 
II 
NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 
A. Globalization of Standards and Standards-Setting as a Solution to the 
Problem of Nontariff Barriers 
As tariff levels have dropped during the post–WWII period, NTBs have 
become the most important manmade impediments to international trade.10 
Many of these NTBs are created by domestic regulations; where this effect is 
intentional, they constitute “regulatory protectionism.”11 Cross-national 
differences in sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards are among the most 
prominent sources of such NTBs since these standards are at the heart of health 
and safety regulations.12 
 
 9. See generally JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND (2d ed. 1999); THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). Such general histories of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, 
however, tend to treat the SPS negotiations only very briefly. 
 10. See, e.g., FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 
1996); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988); Edward D. Mansfield & Marc L. Busch, The 
Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis, 49 INT’L ORG 723 (1995); Edward 
John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall of Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 285 (1987). 
 11. Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1999). 
 12. Most SPS standards are product standards, which specify, usually in rather technical terms, 
characteristics of a product, “such as its size, shape, design, functions and performance, or the way it is 
labeled or packaged before it is put on sale.” WTO TBT Agreement, Annex 1, art. 2. See also ROSS E. 
CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (1990) 
(analyzing general characteristics of safety standards and standards-setting in the U.S.). A standard 
may also specify certain aspects of the process by which a good is produced. Standards as such are not 
mandatory, though regulations often reference or incorporate standards and oblige producers to 
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Recognizing the increasing importance of standards and regulations as 
NTBs, governments started in the 1970s to discuss ways of minimizing their 
trade-impeding effects through the GATT. Reaching an international 
agreement on these issues, however, was not easy since most standards and 
regulations fulfill multiple purposes, including non-trade-related and 
economically beneficial ones.13 Simply lowering or abolishing these NTBs—or 
replacing them with tariffs through “tariffication”—is therefore unlikely to be 
economically optimal, and it would almost certainly be bad public policy.14 
The SPS Agreement is one of the most ambitious attempts to deal with 
NTBs that arise from cross-national differences in technical standards without 
fundamentally impeding the ability of governments to attain legitimate public-
policy objectives, such as protection against diseases and pests. It came into 
force when the WTO succeeded the GATT. It constitutes an integral part of the 
1994 treaty known as the “Uruguay Round Final Act” (of the GATT) or 
“Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization” (WTO Treaty). The 
provisions of the Agreement are therefore binding on all Members of the 
WTO, and compliance is enforceable through the WTO dispute-settlement 
mechanism, giving it “hard law” characteristics.15 
B. Main Provisions of the SPS Agreement 
The SPS Agreement consists of fourteen articles and three appendices. It 
specifies “rules and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and 
enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their 
negative effects on trade.”16 Article 2 affirms the right of member states of the 
 
comply. In addition, standards may elicit compliance through various market and non-market 
incentives, which are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & JAN MARTIN WITTE, 
PRODUCT STANDARDS IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS (2004); Kelly Kollman & Aseem Prakash, Green By 
Choice? Cross-National Variations in Firms’ Responses to EMS-Based Environmental Regimes, 53 
WORLD POL. 399 (2001). The political importance of food-safety and health standards is only 
beginning to be widely recognized. See, e.g., Alan Beattie, Food Safety Clash Gives Taste of Trade 
Battles Ahead: Non-Tariff Barriers, Including Product Standards, Are Frequently Used to Regulate 
Global Commerce, FIN. TIMES (U.S. EDITION), Aug. 1, 2007, at 2. 
 13. Standards are adopted, for instance, to ensure interoperability between products (such as 
computers and IT peripherals), to increase workplace safety or consumer protection, to protect the 
environment, or to provide means for quantitative assessment and comparison. See LAL C. VERMAN, 
STANDARDIZATION: A NEW DISCIPLINE (1973); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings, in 
PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 1–21 (H. Landis Gabel ed., 1987); 
Hendrik Spruyt, The Supply and Demand of Governance in Standard-Setting: Insights from the Past, 8 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 371 (2001). 
 14. “Tariffication” refers to calculating the import-reducing effect of a non-tariff barrier and then 
replacing that barrier with a tariff that would result in an import reduction of equal magnitude. Trade 
negotiations can then focus on tariff levels as the sole barrier to trade. The practice was a prominent 
part of the Tokyo Round of the GATT and other trade negotiations. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 154. 
 15. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000). 
 16. SPS Agreement. 
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WTO to enact SPS measures “for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health” but circumscribes that right by requiring that such measures not be 
inconsistent with the provisions in the Agreement.17 It requires that such 
measures be based on “scientific principles,” forbids the use of SPS measures as 
“disguised restrictions” on international trade, and extends the principle of 
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to SPS measures provided that 
“identical or similar conditions prevail.”18 It also establishes that SPS measures 
that conform to the provisions of the Agreement will be deemed enacted in 
accordance with Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 treaty.19 
Article 3 provides guidelines for the international harmonization of SPS 
measures. It calls on Members to base their SPS measures on “international 
standards, guidelines or recommendation, where they exist” and specifically 
establishes that SPS measures “conform[ing] to” such international standards 
will be presumed to be consistent with the implementing country’s obligations 
under GATT 1994.20 That is, they are safe from a challenge under the new 
GATT/WTO dispute-settlement mechanism.21 At the same time, the article 
allows member states to seek higher levels of SPS protection than existing 
international standards provide, but any SPS measure that diverges from 
international standards to achieve those higher levels of SPS protection must be 
based on scientific principles and must not be maintained without scientific 
evidence.22 The Agreement also obliges Members to use “risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations” and to 
provide, upon request, an explanation for any measure that is not based on 
international standards.23 
 
 17. SPS Agreement art. 2. 
 18. Id.; see also Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade 
Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273–314, esp. at 278 et seq. 
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (discussing national treatment and the MFN). 
 19. SPS Agreement art. 2. “GATT 1994” is the first part of Annex 1 to the WTO Treaty, which 
revises the provisions of the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Its Article XX 
specifies permissible restrictions to free trade. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 20. SPS Agreement art. 3.2 (emphasis added). 
 21. Article 3 also calls on all Members to participate in the standardization activities of the 
relevant international SDOs. 
 22. SPS Agreement art. 5. 
 23. SPS Agreement art. 5.1, 5.8. The remaining articles of the SPS Agreement allow for adaptation 
of trade-related SPS measures to the SPS characteristics of the geographic area from which the product 
originates or for which it is destined (art. 6); oblige Members to notify changes in SPS measures via the 
WTO if the new or changed measure diverges from international standards and otherwise via a single 
national “enquiry point,” which also must provide information about all existing SPS measures (art. 7, 
Annex B). In addition, Article 4 extends the principle of mutual recognition to SPS standards: 
Members must accept SPS measures (and certifications based on such measures) even if they differ 
from their own, as long as they provide for the same level of SPS protection. The Agreement also 
makes provisions for control, inspection, and approval procedures, which allow for review of, but do 
not render void, preexisting regulations not currently based on either international standards or 
scientific risk assessments (art. 8, Annex C). It calls on Members to provide technical assistance to each 
other and especially to developing countries, who may be given specific exceptions or longer transition 
periods to comply (art. 9, 14), and sets up a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
comprised of the member states with a permanent staff from the WTO secretariat, to which the 
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Crucially, if regulations are not based on international standards and if they 
restrict trade, they are open to challenge through the WTO dispute-settlement 
mechanism.24 The burden of proof then rests with the country imposing the 
restriction: it must provide scientific evidence that it was necessary to impose 
standards that diverge from the international ones in order to achieve the 
desired level of SPS protection. Moreover, documents from the negotiations of 
the SPS Agreement show clearly that the negotiators were fully aware of the 
implications of the agreement for the burden of proof in the case of disputes.25 
In short, the rights and obligations created by the SPS Agreement turn in large 
part on what counts as an “international [SPS] standard.” 
This is where delegation comes into play. The SPS Agreement does not just 
abstractly refer to international standards. Instead, it specifically identifies three 
organizations as sources of international SPS standards for purposes of the 
Agreement: the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC or simply “Codex”) 
for standards related to food safety; the International Office of Epizootics 
(OIE, now the World Organization for Animal Health) for standards related to 
animal health and zoonoses; and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC, and the organizations operating within that framework) for standards 
related to plant health.26 Documents from the negotiations show that the 
references to the CAC, OIE, and IPPC were clearly understood at the time as 
acts of delegation. The provisions do not just retrospectively endorse standards 
already developed by these organizations, but they delegate ongoing 
governance functions for the international trading system in that any SPS 
standard adopted by these organizations in their respective realms in the future 
would be automatically recognized as an international standard for purposes of 
the SPS Agreement.27 This is a case of delegation of regulatory authority from 
sovereign states to international or global organizations in that the SPS 
 
Agreement delegates monitoring functions (art. 12, especially 12.4). It is authorized to re-delegate 
some of the monitoring tasks to “relevant international organizations” (art. 12.5).  
 24. The WTO dispute-settlement mechanism provides for the establishment of case-specific 
dispute panels to settle quarrels about compliance with WTO provisions and allows for the appeal of 
dispute-panel decisions to the WTO “Appellate Body” for a final, binding ruling (technically only a 
“recommendations” to the collectivity of the WTO Members, sitting as the “Dispute Settlement Body,” 
but unlike under GATT, these recommendations become binding unless overturned unanimously by 
the Members). See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 2; Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate 
or Litigate?: Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
passim (Winter 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/131, at 8f 
(Dec. 6, 1989); GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Fifth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/13, at 3 (Mar. 19, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points 
Raised at the Sixth Meeting of the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and 
Barriers, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/18 (May 4, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points 
Raised at the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and 
Barriers, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/22 (May 31, 1990). 
 26. SPS Agreement Annex A.3. 
 27. Nothing keeps the member states from affirmatively taking action against a future standard by 
agreeing on an amendment to the SPS Agreement, but this would require negotiated agreement to 
deviate from the new status quo created by the SPS Agreement. 
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Agreement delegates to these organizations the authority to interpret existing 
obligations and to specify rules for the implementation of those obligations.28 
Delegation to these three organizations as the relevant standards-
developing organizations (SDOs) is non-exclusive insofar as most references to 
them refer to “international organizations including” or “in particular” or 
“especially.”29 However, Annex A, Article 3 explicitly recognizes only these 
three SDOs as the international standards-setters for food safety, animal health 
and zoonoses, and plant health standards, respectively. To be sure, Annex A, 
Article 3(d) allows for the possibility that, “for matters not covered by the 
above organizations,”30 standards “promulgated by other relevant international 
organizations open for membership to all Members” might be recognized 
explicitly as “international standards” for the purposes of the SPS Agreement.31 
But the power to raise other organizations to equal status with the OIE, CAC, 
and IPPC was delegated to the new WTO Committee on SPS Measures 
(created by Article 12 of the SPS Agreement), which has never even yet 
received a proposal to do so.32 
In sum, the SPS Agreement obliges governments to use international 
standards (and risk- and compliance-assessment procedures) as the technical 
basis for health and safety regulations, whenever such standards are available, 
subject to some specified exceptions. And it defines “international standards” 
for purposes of the SPS Agreement as the standards developed by three specific 
international organizations: the CAC, the OIE, and the IPPC.33 The SPS 
Agreement thus commits the contracting parties to cooperate in the 
development of SPS standards via these three international (governmental) 
organizations, to which it delegates regulatory authority for standards-setting.34 
 
 28. See Bradley and Kelley’s typology of delegation. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The 
Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14 (Winter 2008). Secondarily and 
derivative of the delegation of regulatory authority, the SPS Agreement also delegates what Bradley 
and Kelley call agenda-setting authority insofar as the CAC, OIE, and IPPC organizations retain the 
power to decide what should get standardized at the international level (the attempts of some GATT 
Members during the SPS negotiations to oblige the OIE to take up a specific work item in its 
standards-setting committees brought, at least initially, a sharp rebuke, see GATT Secretariat, 
Comments by the International Office Epizootics (OIE), MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/19 (May 4, 1990). 
The SPS agreement also grants, at least implicitly, authority to re-delegate in that each of the SDOs 
assigns most practical standards-setting work to specialized committees with variable representation (a 
longstanding practice that was known at the time of the negotiations). 
 29. SPS Agreement. 
 30. “Above organizations” refers to the CAC, the OIE, and the IPPC. 
 31. SPS Agreement Annex A.3(d). 
 32. Not-for-attribution interview (June 19, 2007). 
 33. SPS Agreement Annex A.3. 
 34. E.g., Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A 
Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 
811, 838ff (2002). 
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C. Significance of the Delegation to the CAC, OIE, and IPPC in the SPS 
Agreement 
From a governance perspective, the SPS Agreement of the WTO Treaty is a 
major departure. The near-exclusive focus on tariff reductions in successive 
rounds of multilateral negotiations, from the initial signing of the GATT in 
1947 until at least the beginning of the Tokyo Round in the 1970s,35 was not an 
accident. Rather, it was a consequence of the recognition that achieving a 
consensus on liberalizing international trade required safeguarding the 
prerogative of sovereign states in regulating their domestic economies—inter 
alia through technical, health, and safety standards.36 This recognition of a 
national-level public-policy prerogative was reflected in Articles XI and XX of 
the 1947 GATT, which allowed import and export prohibitions or restrictions if 
“necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, 
grading or marketing of commodities in international trade”37 and exempted 
from other provisions of the Agreement measures for the protection of “public 
morals,” “human, animal or plant life or health,” and other objectives of public 
policy.38 Setting SPS standards at the national level has long been a key element 
of achieving these policy objectives. 
SPS standards are product standards (or sometimes process standards), 
which define certain characteristics of a traded “good” (including live animals 
or raw produce), specify how it may be produced, and, when pertinent, stipulate 
how to measure those characteristics. They are often developed for use as the 
technical basis of health and safety regulations, though they might also be 
established as purely voluntary guidelines. Given the increased economic and 
political prominence of health and safety regulations in recent decades—
especially, but not only, in advanced capitalist democracies39—it seems 
remarkable that governments would accept binding constraints on their power 
to autonomously set such standards.40 It is even more remarkable that they 
would delegate such authority to international organizations.41 
 
 35. Antidumping measures had been addressed already during the Kennedy Round in the 1960s. 
CROOME, supra note 9, at 32. 
 36. Judith Goldstein, Creating the GATT Rules: Politics, Institutions, and American Policy, in 
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 201–32 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993). See also RENÉE MARLIN-
BENNETT, FOOD FIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
DISPUTES (1993) (observing the same reason for focus on tariff reductions in these rounds of 
multilateral negotiations); John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 18, at 
195–231 (arguing that retaining domestic control over market regulation was essential for making the 
post–World War II “liberal” economic order politically viable). 
 37. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 11.2(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
 38. GATT 1947 art. 20. 
 39. E.g., RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY 
(1990); VOGEL, supra note 13; David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of 
Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 557 (2003). 
 40. The 1979 Tokyo Round “Standards Code” or “Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade” 
imposed some constraints. Given the diversity of interests, however, the 1979 Standards Code could 
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There are three reasons why delegation might seem less radical than the 
preceding discussion suggests, but none of them makes it less puzzling why 
governments have delegated regulatory authority. First, as described above, the 
SPS Agreement explicitly acknowledges that it is up to each member state to 
decide the “level of [SPS] protection” it seeks to establish through regulations 
(that is, the acceptable risks for human, animal, and plant health). If the desired 
risk level requires more stringent standards than existing international 
standards, governments are free to require compliance with standards more 
stringent than those developed by the CAC, OIE, and IPP.42 Due to these 
provisions, some have interpreted the SPS Agreement as hardly constraining 
WTO member governments that strive for greater stringency.43 Yet the freedom 
to adopt more stringent standards is subject to more, not fewer constraints. The 
desired risk level, for instance, must be applied consistently, so that maximum 
pesticides-residue levels for imported produce, for instance, cannot be lower 
than maximum levels permitted for otherwise identical, domestically grown 
 
only be agreed upon through vague compromise language on many critical issues, reflecting a strong 
preference by key participants in the negotiations to retain national autonomy, and had little “bite” 
given the weakness of the dispute-settlement mechanism. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement 
After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 146 (1980). For further 
discussion of this point, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 94–98 (1st ed. 1989); Charles Lipson, The Transformation of 
Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 233, 249–53 (Stephen 
Krasner ed., 1983). Moreover, “technically a stand-alone treaty,” the 1979 Agreement was signed by 
only a minority of GATT member states. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 43. The result was a weak 
international institution with a mixed record of eliciting compliance and furthering cooperation, 
especially when U.S.–European conflicts of interest were involved. See JOSEPH M. GRIECO, 
COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE 
(1990). For more detailed discussion of the Tokyo Round negotiations, see Stephen D. Krasner, The 
Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System, 23 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 491 (1979). Further detail is also provided in GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION (1986). 
 41. Delegating some standards-setting authority to specialist expert bodies has become quite 
common at the domestic level. LIORA SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN 
THE MAKING OF STANDARDS (1988). It is less common at the international level, though recent 
research shows that international delegation of standards-setting in general—even to private or hybrid, 
public–private organizations—is not unprecedented. E.g., MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A 
EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2001); Walter Mattli & Tim 
Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD 
POL. 1 (2003); Abraham L. Newman & David Bach, Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of 
Public Power: Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States, 17 GOVERNANCE 387 
(2004). Standards for health and safety regulations, however, tend to be particularly politically 
sensitive. 
 42. Using quantitative comparative qualifiers (such as higher or lower) with respect to standards 
can be misleading as, for instance, allowing higher levels of pharmaceutical or pesticide residues in 
meat or produce creates a less-demanding (and in that sense “lower”) standard. I therefore will speak 
only of more or less “stringent” standards, which I hope will prevent any confusion. 
 43. E.g., David G. Victor, WTO Efforts to Manage Differences in National Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Policies, in DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE 227–68 (David Vogel & Robert A. 
Kagan eds., 2004); not-for-attribution interview with representative of U.S. regulatory agency (July 17, 
2007). 
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produce.44 Moreover, the standards that a country requires for achieving these 
levels of protection must be based on scientific evidence that can stand up to 
international scrutiny if challenged. SPS core negotiators realized that SPS 
regulatory decisions are as much political decisions as technical-scientific 
ones—not least because “science is not monolithic.”45 Even “just” delegating to 
international SDOs the authority to shift the burden of proof (by elevating 
some standards to the status of “international” standards) therefore must have 
been recognized by negotiators as a significant change and real delegation of 
regulatory authority. And decisions by the WTO dispute panels and Appellate 
Body in cases such as Beef Hormones46 suggest that the resulting constraints on 
policy autonomy are real.47 
Second, the same states that negotiated the WTO Treaty and, more 
specifically, the SPS Agreement, were members and active participants in many 
international standards-setting organizations. If power is highly fungible, it 
should make little difference whether countries are negotiating in one forum or 
another,48 and to the extent that even the same individuals represented a given 
country in both contexts (as was the case in some instances), it might have 
seemed hardly like delegation at all.49 Yet, when a country was represented by 
different individuals in the international organizations and in the SPS 
negotiations, bureaucratic politics often meant that maintaining a single, 
coherent position at the international level—if even possible—required 
negotiations among a country’s specialized agencies, which one negotiator 
described as “at least as difficult” as any at the international level.50 Moreover, 
decisionmaking rules differed across the institutional contexts, calling into 
question the assumption that the same states would arrive at the same results 
when negotiating an SPS standard in the GATT/WTO as when negotiating it in 
the CAC, OIE, or IPPC. And years of principal–agent analyses in varied 
contexts have shown that when a government sends its officials to any collective 
body and grants those officials autonomous decisionmaking authority, the 
government (that is, the principal) assumes the unaltered pursuit of its interests 
 
 44. This, in retrospect, very important specific safeguard against regulatory protectionism was 
proposed relatively late during the negotiations. See GATT Secretariat, Framework Agreement on 
Agriculture Reform Programme, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170 (July 11, 1990). 
 45. Not-for-attribution interview (Aug. 2, 2007).  
 46. WT/DS26, WT/DS48, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones). 
 47. As discussed in greater detail in the empirical analysis below, documents and interviews 
suggest that negotiators expected as much. See also Alasdair R. Young & Peter Holmes, Protection or 
Protectionism? EU Food Safety and the WTO, in WHAT’S THE BEEF? THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE 
OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 218 (Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006). 
 48. See also DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY REGIMES (2007). 
 49. See also GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Fifth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers 3, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/13 (Mar. 19, 1990). 
 50. Infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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at its own peril—arguably even more so when delegating to an international 
body.51 
Finally, third, since the SPS Agreement delegates to international scientific 
bodies the authority to develop technical standards, one might think that 
delegation would be unproblematic: technical standards should be all about 
science, not politics. And indeed, the websites of all three organizations 
consciously foster this view.52 Yet, whereas professional norms of scientific 
organizations might seriously constrain the terms of debate, they hardly render 
the decisionmaking processes apolitical.53 
In sum, the SPS Agreement is a real departure from the prior status quo in 
international law and practice.54 It imposes real costs in the form of constraints 
on policy autonomy. How did it come about? 
D. From History to Analytical Questions 
The remainder of this article addresses this issue by asking two more 
specific, analytical questions. As I argued in the Introduction, delegation 
requires a logically prior agreement to institutionalize cooperation. In this 
context, such cooperation was understood to entail harmonizing international 
SPS standards. Attempts to agree on such institutionalized cooperation had 
failed previously—for instance, during the Tokyo Round negotiations; the 1979 
TBT Standards Code, therefore, promulgated only general principles. Reaching 
agreement might well have failed again during the Uruguay Round, given the 
political sensitivity of health and safety regulations. I therefore ask, first, why 
did the GATT contracting parties agree on thus institutionalizing international 
cooperation? 
Once negotiators had agreed that “international” SPS standards and the 
privileging of those standards through the legal presumption of GATT/WTO 
compliance should be the means to institutionalize cooperation, they still had to 
decide which standards constituted those “international standards” for purposes 
of the SPS Agreement. Here negotiators faced a basic choice: They could, as 
part of the negotiations in the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
 
 51. See DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 1. See also 
Tim Büthe, Review of Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 861–62 
(2007). Interestingly, social constructivism leads to the same expectation. See Jeffrey Lewis, The Janus 
Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union, 59 INT’L ORG. 
937 (2005). 
 52. See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius, FAO/WHO Food Standards, http://www.codexalimentarius.net 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2008); World Organization for Animal Health, About Us, 
http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_about.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008); International Phytosanitary 
Portal, Home, https://www.ippc.int/IPP/En/default.jsp (last visited Jan. 20, 2008). 
 53. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 (1991); Mattli & Büthe, supra note 41. 
 54. It is so despite being grounded in the 1979 TBT Agreement Standards Code and occasional 
discussions in the early- to mid-1980s. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Regulations Affecting Trade in Agriculture: Background Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/41 
(Feb. 2, 1988). 
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Regulations and Barriers (WGSP), draw up a list of specific existing standards, 
for which all GATT negotiating parties agreed that they should benefit from 
the presumption of WTO compliance.55 Alternatively, they could delegate 
regulatory authority to international standards-setting organizations. I therefore 
ask, second, why did the GATT contracting parties decide to delegate SPS 
standards-setting instead of keeping direct control over the cooperative outcome 
in the intergovernmental, unanimity-requiring GATT/WTO? I address these 
questions theoretically in Part III and empirically in Part IV. 
III 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 
A. Explaining Cooperation 
Some twenty years ago, scholars of International Relations explicitly 
identified cooperation in world politics as a phenomenon that needed to be 
explained rather than assumed (with only the failure of cooperation to be 
explained).56 Since then, a large and varied literature has addressed this issue 
theoretically and empirically. None of that work has explicitly addressed 
international cooperation on (or delegation of) SPS standards-setting. Yet, it 
suggest a number of alternative—though not necessarily strictly competing—
answers to the question why states might decide to harmonize and more 
generally cooperate on SPS standards at the international level. I focus here on 
theoretical arguments derived from the liberal tradition in International 
Relations theory, then discuss alternative explanations in Part III.C. 
A political-economy approach to international cooperation in the liberal 
tradition of International Relations theory starts from the material interests of 
individuals and groups within states.57 Their preferences (including 
“preferences” in the loose sense of a rank-ordering of alternative means to 
achieve a more general goal, such as greater income or wealth) are assumed to 
be a function of cost-benefit analyses and therefore may differ across 
individuals (and over time). Domestic political institutions aggregate these 
diverse individual preferences within each country and therefore play a key role 
 
 55. That approach was followed, for instance, in the parallel (Uruguay Round) TRIPS agreement 
negotiations. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 34, at 838. It was understood that such a list would 
then have to be updated in regular, subsequent negotiations in the WTO. 
 56. E.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); COOPERATION UNDER 
ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 
WORLD POL. 167 (1978); KEOHANE, supra note 4. 
 57. Many scholars in this tradition assume that actors have nonmaterial as well as material 
interests. No part of liberal International Relations theory depends upon actors pursuing only material 
interests, but insofar as the liberal tradition makes a distinctive set of assumptions about preferences 
rather than just provide a theory of how actors pursue some given set of preferences, it starts from the 
assumption that individuals seek to maximize their own economic welfare. Otherwise, International 
Relations liberalism must be supplemented by a separate theory of preferences. See also Andrew 
Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. 51 INT’L ORG. 513 
(1997). 
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in defining any “national interest” that governments might pursue at the 
international level.58 Specific domestic political institutions weigh domestic 
interests differently and may render some subset of domestic interests 
temporarily or permanently irrelevant, depending on the distribution of 
preferences and the particular institutional structure. Rather than determine 
international outcomes, though, domestic preferences and institutions constrain 
the range of international outcomes that will be a net political gain (in the “win-
set”) for the country’s leader—who might well have a distinct set of preferences 
of his or her own.59 Given these national preferences, the international outcome 
should then be a function of issue-specific bargaining strength and possibly also 
issue linkage.60 
An application of this logic to the realm of SPS standards would start with 
an analysis of the costs and benefits experienced or expected by the different 
interested groups within a country. Here, the above logic suggests that 
competitive export-oriented farmers and food industries will, ceteris paribus, 
favor international cooperation in general and international harmonization of 
standards in particular as a means of improving market access for their 
products. Import-competing farmers and industries should, by contrast, oppose 
international harmonization (supporting it only under the unlikely condition 
that they expect it to provide them with more protection, given the structure of 
the market). A given country’s national preference in the negotiations should 
then reflect the cost-benefit analyses of the groups with the greatest political 
influence, given domestic political institutions. One implication of this 
theoretical logic is that changes of political majorities due to elections can 
change government preferences regarding international cooperation on SPS 
standards and regulations if the changes strengthen or weaken the political 
clout of one domestic group or another. Finally, governments may be expected 
to have a positive predisposition towards international cooperation, given that 
shifting decisionmaking from the level of national political institutions to 
intergovernmental bargaining strengthens the executive relative to other 
domestic interests that might otherwise constrain it.61 At the international level, 
cooperation—and here specifically the privileging of international standards—
should result if, after cost-benefit analyses of this and other possible courses of 
 
 58. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM, supra note 4. See also LISA MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC 
COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000). 
 59. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). Any room for a distinctive position of the government or negotiator might also 
be conceptualized as agency slack (with voters or citizens as the principal), but such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 60. See, e.g., Christina L. Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153 (2004). A functionalistic neoliberal-
institutionalist perspective (such as KEOHANE, supra note 4), would yield similar expectations, but 
retaining Realism’s analytical assumption of states as unitary actors, it would focus on aggregate costs 
and benefits for the country; domestic politics might be ignored.  
 61. Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, in 
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 356 (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 
eds., 1972). 
08__BUTHE.DOC 6/9/2008  8:06:10 AM 
Winter 2008] THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS 233 
action and taking into account bargaining strength, it emerges as the best 
solution to the problem of trade-inhibiting SPS measures. 
B. Explaining Delegation of Regulatory Authority 
An agreement to establish or increase cooperation on regulatory issues does 
not necessarily lead to the delegation of regulatory authority. In many areas of 
international market regulation, international cooperation has taken the form 
of institutionalizing transgovernmental exchanges. Such transgovernmental 
cooperation has been institutionalized, for instance, by setting up regular 
meetings or communications of regulators with equivalent regulatory functions 
for their respective domestic markets, without creating (or delegating to 
existing) international organizations capable of becoming actors in their own 
rights.62 
Having agreed to privilege international standards, the contracting parties in 
the SPS negotiations faced two main possibilities. First, governments could, as 
part of the Uruguay Round SPS negotiations, draw up a list of standards that 
would explicitly be recognized as “international standards” for purposes of the 
agreement and establish some institutional mechanism for extending or revising 
that list to allow for an up-to-date list of all SPS standards that have broad or 
even unanimous approval by WTO Members. As a practical matter, the initial 
list would probably have to have consisted of existing standards, developed by 
standards-developing organizations (SDOs) outside the GATT framework; 
additions to that list could then have been developed within the institutions of 
the GATT/WTO or there could have been case-by-case negotiations over 
whether any specific standard developed outside the GATT/WTO may be 
added to the list. This arrangement might have entailed the retrospective 
endorsement of standardization work by other organizations, but it would not 
have entailed delegation in the sense of a prospective grant of authority. 
Alternatively, governments could delegate authority for standards-setting to 
international SDOs. As described above,63 the actual SPS Agreement provides 
for the latter: comprehensive delegation in the sense that three organizations 
were recognized without reservations as the sources of international SPS 
standards, retrospectively and prospectively. 
 
 62. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); David Andrew Singer, Capital Rules: The 
Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531 (2004). 
Transgovernmental networks of specialists (a particular form of epistemic community) might also 
develop distinct interests, but they usually must exercise influence (if any) via domestic political 
institutions; they exhibit far fewer of the characteristics of an “actor” in world politics than 
international organizations. See Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority? Non-State Actors 
in World Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. (NEW YORK) 281 (2004); Frederick W. Frey, The Problem of Actor 
Designation in Political Analysis, 17 COMP. POL. 127 (1985). 
 63. See supra Part II.B. 
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Why did governments decide to delegate? Principal–agent theory is a 
natural starting point for answering this question.64 Adopting a P-A perspective, 
however, is not a neutral decision with respect to one’s position in the broader 
theoretical debates in International Relations. One of the core assumptions of 
P-A theory is that the decision to delegate is a rational, strategic calculation;  
P-A theory also assumes that the subsequent behavior of both principal and 
agent is driven by the logic of instrumental rationality. This renders P-A theory 
inconsistent with theoretical perspectives that assume primacy for the logic of 
appropriateness. Moreover, when P-A theory is applied to international 
relations, some of the benefits of delegation that it identifies require the ability 
to distinguish between the government of a state and socio-political groups 
within that state—that is, actors at the subnational level. This renders parts of 
P-A theory incompatible with theoretical traditions that assume unitary states 
as the smallest analytical units. A brief discussion of the key reasons for 
delegating authority, according to P-A theory, will illustrate this point. 
The P-A literature has identified a number of reasons for delegating 
authority, focused on the benefits of delegation. Most pertinent for the 
delegation of regulatory authority are three of these benefits. First, 
comprehensive delegation to an SDO offers the opportunity to continuously 
benefit from the specialized technical expertise at the SDO. In the context of 
the SPS Agreement, this arrangement ensures efficient updating of the set of 
SPS standards recognized as “international” for purposes of the Agreement. 
The alternative arrangement, which would have incorporated into the treaty a 
list of specific, existing SPS standards (possibly developed by the same 
organizations) would have required frequent, renewed trade negotiations to 
recognize new or revised SPS standards.65 Second, comprehensive delegation 
“locks in” the policy of deference to international standards. It therefore should 
make the commitment not to use SPS measures as nontariff barriers to trade 
more credible than the alternative arrangement, wherein the continued 
effectiveness of the SPS Agreement would depend upon periodically renewed 
political negotiations to update the list of recognized international standards 
(assuming that new SPS concerns occasionally arise and would solicit cross-
 
 64. For detailed reviews, categorizations, and discussions, see DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN 
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY 
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 1; JOHN HUBER & CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002); Jonathan Bendor, Amihai 
Glazer & Thomas Hammond, Theories of Delegation, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235 (2001); Bradley & 
Kelley, supra note 28, at 3–9; Tim Büthe, The Dynamics of Principals and Agents: Institutional Change 
and Persistence in Setting U.S. Accounting Standards, Mimeo (Duke Univ., 2004–2006). 
 65. Büthe, supra note 64; Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Accountability in Accounting? The Politics 
of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest, 18 GOVERNANCE 399 (2005); Walter Mattli & Tim 
Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons From a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (Summer/Autumn 2005). Bradley and Kelley identify delegation as 
one way to reduce the transaction costs of international cooperation as the agent makes “running 
policy decisions so that states do not have to continually renegotiate.” Bradley & Kelley, supra note 28, 
at 26. 
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nationally variable regulatory responses).66 Third, delegating standards-setting 
to recognized technical experts in a relatively insulated, transnational, or 
transgovernmental agency protects the trade negotiators (and the leading 
politicians who are their political masters) from possible blame if a particular 
set of standards subsequently turns out to be politically contentious or 
unpopular within a country. International delegation thus offers the 
opportunity for “shifting responsibility” or “blame avoidance.”67 
The first of these benefits (efficiency gain due to agent expertise) is entirely 
consistent with all rationalist theories of world politics, including International 
Relations Realism. Making a strong unitary-state assumption, Realists must 
expect an agent to be faithful to its principal’s preferences; any agent acting 
otherwise would be replaced. It follows that, if a group of states delegates 
power to an agent, Realists would expect the agent to act on the preferences of 
those states, weighted somehow by the distribution of power within the group. 
Delegation should therefore create few concerns beyond those that already 
arise from the international distribution of power (agent-shirking is assumed 
away by the Realist postulate that international institutions have no 
independent effect). Consequently, from a Realist perspective, the efficiency 
gains that can be obtained thanks to the agent’s specialized expertise should be 
welcomed by states—and constitute the only reason for delegation. 
Scholars in the liberal tradition of International Relations theory, which 
recognizes international institutions as a constraint, would also acknowledge the 
first benefit (expertise and efficiency gain) but emphasize the second 
(delegation creating a more credible commitment to continued cooperation).68 
A liberal political-economy perspective, which does not assume unitary states, 
would also recognize the third benefit of delegation (responsibility shifting, or 
blame avoidance).69 Especially in democratic polities, governments have this 
incentive to delegate when the risk of suffering political costs from regulatory 
outcomes exceeds the likely political benefit from having direct control over the 
regulator (assuming that regulation itself is considered necessary or politically 
desirable). Countries should support delegation of SPS regulatory authority 
proportional to the extent to which they anticipate experiencing these benefits. 
 
 66. See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
213 (1990) (SPECIAL ISSUE); Terry M. Moe, Power and Political Institutions, 3 PERSP. POL. 215 (2005); 
see also Tim Büthe & Helen Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing 
Countries: Increasing FDI Through Trade Agreements?, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2008); Beth 
A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International 
Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000). 
 67. See Büthe, supra note 64; Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal 
Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global 
Private Governance: Lessons From a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 68. See also Nielson & Tierney, supra note 8, at 244. 
 69. High risk aversion would reduce the benefit of open-ended delegation vis-à-vis the adoption of 
known standards developed by the same SDO, but variation in risk aversion is beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
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Delegation, however, is not all gain, and a political-economy perspective 
explicitly stipulates that preferences are a function of both (expected) costs and 
benefits. Particularly important for the delegation of regulatory authority 
should be autonomy costs, that is, losses of policymaking autonomy anticipated 
as a consequence of delegating authority of a particular kind. These costs of 
delegation may differ across countries as a function of countries’ differential 
ability to exert influence in international bodies. Costs may also differ across 
agents as a function of characteristics of the specific international body to whom 
standards-setting authority might be delegated, such as its organizational 
structure or decision-making rules and practices. A proper analysis of the 
possible agents is beyond the scope of this article, but liberal International 
Relations theory—by appreciating the autonomy costs of delegation—leads us 
to expect that a decision to delegate is tied to the decision on agent selection. 
C. Alternative Explanations 
A first set of alternative hypotheses can be derived from the Realist 
tradition in International Relations. Although Realism is by no means 
monolithic,70 the emphasis on the international distribution of power and the 
common assumption that power is highly fungible tend to lead Realists to 
expect that the most powerful states dominate international negotiations and, 
most importantly, that international standards will reflect the preferences of 
those states.71 Harmonization on the basis of “international” standards thus 
might simply be a way for the most powerful states to force their own standards 
(and the adjustment costs of harmonization) onto weaker countries. Realism 
thus leads us to expect that the most powerful countries would push for 
harmonization against the preferences of weaker states.72 
A corollary of this logic is that cooperation can arise if it is sought by a 
single predominant state. Alternatively, if there are two or more very powerful 
states, cooperation requires only that a sufficiently large subset of these states 
prefers the cooperative outcome to the status quo; others might then participate 
to avoid any negative externalities of being left out.73 Unfortunately, Realism 
does not provide us with a clear deductive logic for identifying the number or 
names of such powerful states ex ante—and the GATT’s usual “principal 
supplier” rule for negotiating tariff reductions did not apply to the negotiations 
 
 70. See Stephen G. Brooks, Dueling Realisms, 51 INT’L ORG. 445 (1997). 
 71. See Krasner, supra note 53. See, e.g., DREZNER, supra note 48; Joanne Gowa & Soo Yeon Kim, 
An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94, 57 WORLD POL. 453 (2005). 
See also David Baldwin, Introduction, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATE (David Baldwin ed., 1993) (on the assumption of fungibility of power). 
 72. Hegemonic stability theory leads to the same expectation, though HST scholars might 
emphasize the public-goods component of standards, which would be undersupplied, especially at the 
international level, without a hegemon. Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective and 
Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377 (1983). 
 73. See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF 
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2000). 
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leading up to the SPS Agreement. But presumably Realists would look to (at 
least) the United States and the EC (maybe also Australia as the leader of the 
Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries) to ascertain the potential for 
cooperation. 
By the logic of Realism, those same powerful states should dominate any 
negotiations over specific SPS standards, in accordance with the international 
distribution of power—regardless of whether those negotiations are part of the 
GATT negotiation or take place by proxy in international organizations.74 
Realism therefore has little to say about whether powerful states will seek to 
achieve the internationalization of their preferred standards via the delegation 
of standards-setting authority. It is of little significance for Realists, except that 
delegation might be preferred if it yields efficiency gains for powerful states (as 
discussed above). 
A second set of alternative hypotheses can be derived from Constructivism 
or Sociological Institutionalism. Scholars in the constructivist tradition in 
International Relations theory see ideas, norms, and context-specific identity or 
social roles as shaping the very definition of actors’ interests. In seeking to 
explain behavior and outcomes, constructivists then emphasize actors pursuing 
those interests in accordance with the logic of appropriateness.75 This theoretical 
perspective leads us to expect that a preference for cooperation, and specifically 
harmonization on the basis of international SPS standards, would be driven by 
the perceived legitimacy of international standards-setting. We should therefore 
observe little controversy over this issue, unless perceptions of legitimacy 
differed across countries.76 
Although constructivists have thought and written extensively about the 
general issue of cooperation, no constructivist theory of delegation has been 
developed. One might surmise that international delegation never constitutes 
“appropriate” behavior for governments if the norm of sovereignty is very 
strong. Yet, constructivists do not suggest that states live in an imaginary world. 
Given interdependence (inherently recognized by a country’s participation in 
GATT), delegation of (some) authority to an international body may be 
appropriate not only if there is a strong international norm of such delegation, 
shared among states (such as for UN membership, which delegates some 
authority to the Security Council), but also if the exercise of authority by the 
international body in question is perceived as legitimate. Delegation to 
international organizations of technical, scientific experts should therefore be 
relatively easy (and enjoy widespread support), because “science” is usually 
 
 74. See DREZNER, supra note 48, at 162 (making this point particularly forcefully and in specific 
application to SPS standards-setting). 
 75. E.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943 (1998). 
 76. Here the distinction that Giandomenico Majone draws between delegation and trustee 
relationship may be pertinent but is beyond the scope of this article. Giandomenico Majone, Two 
Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103 
(2001). 
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understood as having been socially constructed as highly objective and neutral, 
lending such organizations an inherently high degree of legitimacy.77 
IV 
COOPERATION AND DELEGATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Research Methods 
Empirical research on international negotiations presents special challenges. 
Public records of the negotiations are often sparse and require critical reading, 
since negotiating positions may have been taken for public consumption and 
may have differed substantially from countries’ true preferences.78 Internal 
documents of the participating governments tend to be classified—especially 
documents showing internal disagreements, actions subsequently regarded as 
mistakes, or other politically sensitive information—usually for several decades 
afterwards. And many important steps in international negotiations may leave 
no paper trail at all.79 Participants in the negotiations, if contacted soon after the 
conclusion of the negotiations, may have strong professional and personal 
interests in not fully disclosing their actions and the reasons for those actions. If 
participants are contacted long afterwards, the incentives to provide a selective 
account of negotiations may have declined, but they may not remember the 
details—if they are still available for interviews at all.80 
The following analysis of the negotiations that led to the SPS Agreement 
draws on the available secondary sources, but there are only very sparse prior 
empirical analyses of those negotiations. Fortunately, this article can draw on a 
large number of primary sources, in particular documents from the GATT 
negotiations, which have been recently released by the WTO—much earlier 
than is customary for diplomatic documents.81 
The empirical account below is sometimes written such that is seems to 
equate countries’ negotiating positions with their true preferences. The fact that 
the GATT negotiation documents were not intended to be made public (for 
many years, if ever) makes it more likely that these documents are genuinely 
informative. I did not, however, simply assume that the negotiating positions 
 
 77. Evan Schofer, Science Associations in the International Sphere 1875–1990: The Rationalization 
of Science and the Scientization of Society, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 249 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999). 
 78. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & NICHOLAS BAYNE, HANGING TOGETHER: COOPERATION 
AND CONFLICT IN THE SEVEN-POWER SUMMITS (1987); see also P. TERENCE HOPMANN, THE 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS (1996); JOHN S. 
ODELL, NEGOTIATING THE WORLD ECONOMY (2000). 
 79. See Gilbert R. Winham, Practitioners’ Views of International Negotiation, 32 WORLD POL. 111 
(1979). 
 80. The Canadian lead negotiator for the SPS Agreement, for instance, passed away a few years 
ago. 
 81. References use the GATT document number or symbol. Unless otherwise noted, all of these 
documents are contained in the GATT Digital Archive, http://gatt.stanford.edu (last visited June 17, 
2007). 
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expressed in the documents and countries’ true preferences were identical 
(which would of course be problematic, given the incentives for strategic 
misrepresentation of one’s preferences in negotiations). Instead, I used a series 
of phone interviews with Uruguay Round trade negotiators from several 
countries (and some published accounts of participants) to ascertain actual 
preferences, sometimes through triangulation.82 Interviews also played a crucial 
role insofar as international negotiations often leave a rather thin paper trail, 
and the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations were described to me by two 
seasoned participants of international trade negotiations as having been 
particularly bad in that respect: a large part of the negotiations took place over 
lunches and informal, private meetings among a small “core” group of 
negotiators (the final wording of many articles of the SPS Agreement is said to 
have originated on cocktail napkins). That many of the interviewees no longer 
have any role in government gives me some additional confidence in my 
reliance on a combination of documents and interviews. Inherently and 
inevitably, however, this research strategy cannot resolve all uncertainty; it is 
merely the best available. 
B. Origins of the SPS Negotiations 
The Uruguay Round negotiations were officially launched by the 
“Ministerial Declaration” adopted on September 20, 1986, by the 
representatives of ninety-four countries in Punta del Este, Uruguay.83 Even this 
launch of the negotiations was already “the culmination of five years of hard 
work,”84 during which the liberalization of agricultural trade had emerged as 
one key ingredient of the package deal that was going to make it possible to 
launch (and ultimately conclude) the Uruguay GATT round. Including in the 
negotiation the liberalization of agricultural trade was a sine qua non for major 
agricultural exporters such as the United States and the Cairns Group led by 
Australia and also for many developing countries.85 
Imposing some restrictions on the (ab)use of sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures was an integral part of the demands for agricultural trade 
 
 82. The interviews were conducted between June and August 2007. 
 83. E.g., Press Communiqué, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT/1396 (Sept. 25, 
1986). The GATT had at that point eighty-five contracting parties; they were joined by representatives 
of nine further countries whose governments took a close interest or anticipated adhering to the GATT 
in the near future. 
 84. HUGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 57 (1995). 
 85. See CROOME, supra note 9, at 7–28; CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, FOOD FIGHTS OVER FREE TRADE: 
HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROMOTE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION (2003); 
Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in 
the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 351–53 (2002). Part of the deal that enabled launching the 
Uruguay Round was an agreement that improved market access for goods produced by developing 
countries (such as textiles), access to developing country markets, and trade in services would also be 
on the agenda. 
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liberalization.86 Accordingly, the Punta del Este declaration noted among the 
“Subjects for Negotiations” (and as one of the three goals for the agriculture 
negotiations): “minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account 
the relevant international agreements.”87 It also noted that “negotiations shall 
aim to improve, clarify, or expand, as appropriate, agreements and 
arrangements [such as the ‘Codes’] negotiated in the Tokyo Round of 
Multilateral Negotiations.”88 Indeed, the 1979 Code for Technical Barriers to 
Trade (the “Standards Code”) was a natural starting point for any agreement 
on SPS measures, and it was not certain until the end of 1990 that there would 
be a separate SPS Agreement rather than some kind of SPS supplement to the 
TBT Agreement.89 Negotiations about SPS measures, however, took place from 
the start within the Negotiating Group on Agriculture (NG5).90 
NG5 started meeting in late February 1987 and in June and July began an 
initial exchange of negotiating positions on SPS measures. Then, at its tenth 
meeting, on September 14, 1988, it established a separate Working Group on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, exceptionally chaired by a 
staff expert from the GATT secretariat, Gretchen Stanton.91 It was this Working 
Group that negotiated the SPS Agreement during the following two years.92 The 
 
 86. Not-for-attribution interviews with negotiators of two agriculture-exporting states. 
 87. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986, MIN(86)/W/19, 25 
I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (1986). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Applicability of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade to 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/5 (May 22, 1989); 
GATT Secretariat, Harmonization and Transparency, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/9 (Jan. 30, 1990); 
GATT Secretariat, Form and Disposition of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations 
and Barriers (SPS Measures), MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/10 (Feb. 12, 1990); GATT Secretariat, 
Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Sixth Meeting of the Working Group on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/18 (May 4, 1990); GATT 
Secretariat, Seventh and Eighth Meetings of the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Regulations and Barriers, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/5 (June 19, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Draft Text on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7 (Nov. 20, 1990); see also not-for-
attribution interview (Aug. 2, 2007). 
 90. See Donna Roberts, Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 377, 382 (1998). The Negotiating Group on 
Agriculture was the fifth of fourteen (sub)groups formed by the Group of Negotiations on Goods after 
its initial at-large meetings in December 1986 and January 1987. The other groups were: tariffs, non-
tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, 
GATT Articles, safeguards, MTN agreements and arrangements (Tokyo Round codes), subsidies and 
countervailing measures, dispute settlement, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, trade-
related investment measures, and functioning of the GATT system. GATT Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of 
the Group of Negotiations on Goods, MTN.GNG/5 (Feb. 9, 1987). Services formed the fifteenth, 
separate negotiating group. See also CROOME, supra note 9, at 27f (discussing the structure of the 
Uruguay round negotiations). 
 91. The decision to form the separate WGSP was taken at the suggestion of the U.S. delegation but 
had widespread support. See GATT Secretariat, Communication from the United States on a Health and 
Sanitary Working Group, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/77 (Sept. 13, 1988); GATT Secretariat, Tenth Meeting of 
the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/10 (Sept. 14, 1988); CROOME, supra note 9. 
 92. Except for a few last-minute changes in 1993, the negotiations of the SPS Agreement were 
largely concluded by the end of 1990, four years prior to the rest of the agriculture negotiations. Several 
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negotiations within this group were driven primarily by a core or “drafting” 
group of eight countries or parties: Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European 
Community (EC, with Gthe Commission representing the then-twelve member 
states), Finland (on behalf of the non-EC “Nordic” countries), Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United States.93 No more than about twenty other countries 
took a sufficiently strong interest to regularly attend the working group 
meetings.94 
C. Negotiating Cooperation 
I have argued above for a domestic political-economic explanation of 
national preferences for (or against) cooperation on SPS standards and 
standardization.95 The formation and change of the U.S. position provides a 
useful illustration, supporting the argument that attention to the cost-benefit 
analyses of different domestic groups and the political institutions that 
aggregate their interests leads to a better understanding of national interests 
and international outcomes than assuming unitary states. Even though 
international cooperation on SPS standards affected a range of interests—
including not only the obvious economic groups such as (internationally 
competitive) U.S. farmers but also consumer-protection advocates and 
regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—U.S. 
agricultural interests had particular political clout in the Reagan and Bush (Sr.) 
administrations. The United States therefore initially approached the SPS 
negotiations (just as the agriculture negotiations more generally) strictly as an 
agricultural exporter, with an official from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
as the lead negotiator. However, representatives from a number of U.S. 
government agencies became later part of the U.S. delegation to the SPS 
negotiations or formed part of an interagency group back in the United States, 
which had to be regularly consulted by the Geneva-based negotiators. As these 
agencies opposed negotiating away policy autonomy as part of any deal to gain 
greater access for U.S. agricultural exports to foreign markets, the inclusion of 
representatives from those agencies in the negotiations made the internal 
negotiations within the U.S. delegation at times “at least as difficult” as the 
 
negotiators have in interviews attributed the relatively smooth and fast progress of the SPS 
negotiations in part to the skill of the chairperson in facilitating negotiations and the fact that she was 
not affiliated with any of the national delegations. The high level of abstraction and seeming technical 
obscurity of the issues also facilitated agreement. 
 93. Thailand is sometimes alleged to have been a member of the informal core or “drafting” group 
and was indeed invited to join the group, but declined since participation in the core group would have 
required the permanent presence of a Thai SPS technical expert in Geneva, which the Thai government 
considered too costly. Only changing members of the regular Thai diplomatic corps attended many of 
the formal meetings of the working group. The predominance of small groups of countries most active 
in international trade in the goods in questions had a long tradition in GATT. See Gowa & Kim, supra 
note 71; Steinberg, supra note 85, at 354 et seq. 
 94. Roberts, supra note 90, at 396 n.33.  See generally review of documents and not-for-attribution 
interviews.  
 95. See supra Part III.A. 
08__BUTHE.DOC 6/9/2008  8:06:10 AM 
242 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:219 
international negotiations.96 Nonexport interests then gained a leading voice in 
shaping the U.S. negotiating position after the 1992 U.S. elections, which for the 
first time in twelve years gave political control of the White House and both 
houses of Congress to the Democrats, who have long been more favorably 
inclined toward regulation, for instance, for consumer protection. 
The United States thus approached the Uruguay Round negotiations 
primarily as an agricultural exporter. Agricultural exporters considered health-
related measures a “big loophole” in the GATT, which needed to be addressed 
through some kind of agreement on SPS measures if agricultural trade 
liberalization were to be effective.97 The main concern here was that, if the issue 
were not addressed as part of the same negotiations that were going to reduce 
tariffs on (and subsidies for) agriculture, the use of such measures as 
protectionist tools would greatly increase in the aftermath of nominal 
liberalization of agricultural trade. International cooperation—and specifically 
the international harmonization of SPS standards and the privileging of 
international standards through a presumption of GATT compliance—was seen 
as offering the best way of achieving a safeguard against subsequent increases in 
the stringency of SPS standards for protectionist purposes. International 
harmonization would force countries with stringent standards to justify those 
standards, providing opportunities for agricultural exporters to expose and 
potentially block protectionist measures.98 Moreover, for U.S. agricultural 
exporters, which were facing some of the most stringent standards at home, 
there was little risk that international standards would be more stringent than 
domestic ones, thus leveling the playing field.99 Accordingly, the United States 
made the initial proposal (in July 1987) that the Negotiating Group on 
Agriculture harmonize health and sanitary standards and “base national [health 
and sanitary] regulations on internationally agreed standards and processing 
and production methods . . . .”100 
Australia initially objected to an ex ante commitment to harmonization, 
noting that, in its view, the U.S. proposal “seems to go beyond the ministerial 
mandate.”101 The members of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, however, 
agreed in their December 7–8, 1987, meeting to consider the issue. They invited 
 
 96. Interview with U.S. SPS negotiator. These internal divisions on the U.S. side also were 
apparent to foreign negotiators, as indicated by one of them. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 19, 
2007; Aug. 2, 2007). 
 97. Not-for-attribution interview (June 19, 2007). 
 98. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 15, 2007; June 19, 2007; July 17, 2007). 
 99. See generally ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER (2000); VOGEL, 
supra note 13. 
 100. GATT Secretariat, United States Proposal for Negotiations on Agriculture at 1, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14 (July 7, 1987). 
 101. GATT Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Agriculture 6–7 July 1987 at 3, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/15 (July 24, 1987). 
08__BUTHE.DOC 6/9/2008  8:06:10 AM 
Winter 2008] THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS 243 
elaboration of national positions on this and other “technical” matters via more 
“specific proposals or discussion papers.”102 
The United States supplied the first such discussion paper in February 1988. 
It presented harmonization as the only way to achieve the agreed objective of 
reducing the adverse effect of health and sanitary regulations on trade, and it 
suggested that harmonization was a legitimate means to achieve this agreed-
upon objective, given that it had been “under consideration since the early 
preparatory stages of the negotiations.”103 Indeed, two European negotiators 
recalled in interviews that the EC (and several non-EC European governments) 
had also favored international harmonization and the privileging of 
international SPS standards since before the beginning of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations because it extended to the realm of SPS measures the core logic of 
the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement Code. For EC member states, international 
institutionalized standardization also extended to the multilateral setting of the 
GATT the way in which EC member states had decided to deal with trade-
inhibiting differences in SPS measures in the “minilateral” setting of the EC 
itself. EC negotiators recalled having sought international harmonization of 
SPS standards in part because the principle enjoyed legitimacy from having 
previously been endorsed by EC member states as a solution when the same 
kind of issue arose as part of the Single Market program of “Europe 1992.”104 
The United States thus pushed for harmonization on the basis of 
international “scientific standards,”105 and the European Community endorsed 
harmonization on the basis of SPS standards developed by international 
organizations in its submission of April 20, 1988.106 Developing countries also 
broadly supported international cooperation on SPS standards via 
harmonization at the international level. South Korea, Brazil, and Colombia, 
for instance, explicitly endorsed the harmonization objective in written 
submissions,107 and one observer noted that developing countries were actually 
 
 102. GATT Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/5 
(Dec. 9, 1987). 
 103. GATT Secretariat, A Discussion Paper on Issues Related to the Negotiations Submitted by the 
United States at 9, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/44 (Feb. 22, 1988). 
 104. Not-for-attribution interviews (July 30, 2007; Aug. 2, 2007). 
 105. GATT Secretariat, A Discussion Paper on Issues Related to the Negotiations Submitted by the 
United States at 11–13, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/44 (Feb. 22, 1988). It also discussed specific organizations 
that in the U.S. delegation’s view produced such standards. Neither the European Communities nor 
Canada addressed the issue of SPS measures in their respective discussion papers on technical issues 
(GATT Secretariat, Discussion Document on Some Technical Aspects in Relation to the Use of PSE in 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/45 (Feb. 19, 1988); GATT 
Secretariat, The Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE): An Aggregate Indicator of Adverse Trade Effects 
of Measures of Support and Protection for Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/46 (Feb. 23, 1988)), possibly 
indicating the lesser interest in the specific issue of SPS standards and regulation among non-U.S. 
agriculture negotiators. Not-for-attribution interview (June 19, 2007). 
 106. GATT Secretariat, Communication from the European Communities, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/56 
(Apr. 20, 1988). 
 107. GATT Secretariat, Proposal for Negotiations on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/130 (Nov. 28, 
1989); GATT Secretariat, Proposal on Special, Differential and More Favourable Treatment for 
Developing Countries, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/132 (Nov. 28, 1989). 
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on the whole more strongly supportive of international standards and 
standardization than some of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries.108 In short, broad agreement effectively 
settled the issue early on. The Summary of the October 1988 meeting of NG5 
notes that “a participant” still took issue with the “undue emphasis” on 
harmonization and that this participant had pointed out that “there could also 
be other ways . . . to achieve the goals established by the Punta del Este 
Declaration.”109 But this appears to have been an isolated position by that time 
already. By November 1988, the Chairman of the NG5 could include 
“harmonization of national [SPS] regulations” based on international standards 
among the issues on which there was “a broad measure of consensus.”110 That 
consensus was confirmed and the objective endorsed by the Montreal Trade 
Negotiations Committee Meeting at the Ministerial Level in December 1988.111 
The United States and the EC clearly played a central role in the 
negotiations; their agreement was crucial for the decision to focus on 
international standards as the means of addressing the SPS issue. This finding 
confirms the importance of the major powers for GATT negotiations—
measured here primarily by involvement in international (nonsocialist) trade. It 
is consistent with Realist expectations. 
The importance of the United States and EC, however, is also consistent 
with the expectations of liberal International Relations theory. Moreover, 
contrary to Realist expectations, nothing indicates that the decision to 
institutionalize cooperation through harmonization was imposed by richer or 
more powerful countries on poorer or less powerful ones. Though some of the 
developing countries objected to the procedures through which the agreement 
on harmonization and the privileging of international standards had been 
reached,112 none of them appears to have perceived the outcome as detrimental 
 
 108. Not-for-attribution interview (July 30, 2007). 
 109. GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Eleventh Meeting of the 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture at 9, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/86 (Nov. 10, 1988). 
 110. GATT Secretariat, Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture at 1, 4, 
MTN.GNG/16 (Nov. 30, 1988). 
 111. GATT Secretariat, Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture at 4, 
MTN.GNG/16 (Nov. 30, 1988); GATT Secretariat, Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at 
Ministerial Level 13, MTN.TNC/7(MIN) (Dec. 9, 1988). Working Group documents note expressions of 
concern on two later occasions (by Japan and South Korea, according to interviews) that 
harmonization might mean making standards identical, without regard for objective differences in 
geography or climate (GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Third Meeting of 
the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/6 (Oct. 17, 1989)), but these concerns did not translate into opposition to 
the harmonization objective as such. 
 112. Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Tanzania, for instance, all went on the record with 
procedural objections, regarding the “insufficient transparency” of the SPS negotiations due to the 
tendency to restrict consultations on details to “a very small number” of participant countries (GATT 
Secretariat, Trade Negotiations Committee, MTN.TNC/10 (Apr. 27, 1989)); most of the real 
negotiations occurred in the informal meetings of the “core” or “drafting group,” as noted above. Such 
complaints caused the chair in October 1989 to ask that suggestions for changes (to the draft text) be 
submitted in writing (GATT Secretariat, Draft Text for a Decision by Contracting Parties on Sanitary 
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to their interests. Moreover, if developing countries indeed failed to oppose 
international harmonization when they “should” have (an inevitably speculative 
proposition), it was much more likely due to a lack of technical expertise than 
to formal exclusion or scarcity of financial resources.113 When drafts of the 
agreement were circulated, thus exposing the substance of the informal 
agreement among the core negotiators, no objections from developing countries 
were recorded.114 
These observations about developing countries are consistent with the 
expectations derived from a sociological institutionalist or International 
Relations constructivist perspective: developing countries should be expected to 
support the endorsement of, and privileged position for, international standards 
if international standards enjoy high legitimacy. And indeed, the tone of many 
of the recorded statements (and my conversations with negotiators) suggests 
that international standards in this realm enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy 
among developing and developed countries alike.115 
At the same time, the findings are also consistent with liberal International 
Relations theory, which can explain some observations that remain unexplained 
otherwise. Most of the developing countries that took an interest in the SPS 
negotiations approached the Uruguay Round negotiations as agricultural 
exporters. This definition of their national interests was often due to political 
institutions that ensured political dominance for a small number of large-scale, 
internationally competitive producers of exportable agricultural products over 
(often more numerous) inefficient producers for the domestic market (who 
might oppose free trade to reduce the risk of import competition). Similarly, the 
United States approached the SPS negotiations predominantly from the 
perspective of an agricultural exporter, rather than from the perspective of a 
potential importer with (in global comparison) relatively high domestic levels of 
health and safety regulations. This U.S. approach is hard to explain in terms of 
some general national interest, but it should be expected given the domestic 
political institutions and particular political configuration at the time. 
Moreover, after the 1992 U.S. elections, competing interests, such as 
 
and Phytosanitary Measures, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/26 (Oct. 1, 1990)), though there is no 
indication that procedures subsequently changed. 
 113. See, e.g., Bhagirath Lal Das, Strengthening Developing Countries in the WTO, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK ¶ 59 (2002), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/td8.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); see also 
BÜTHE & WITTE, supra note 12; Mattli & Büthe, Global Private Governance, supra note 65 (showing 
the importance of technical expertise for the ability to influence international standardization in 
various fora). 
 114. Not-for-attribution interview (July 30, 2007). Argentina was the only developing country that 
had a designated SPS representative. Whereas several other developing countries took an interest in 
the SPS negotiations, they had very frequent turnover in attendees, which has made it impossible to 
interview negotiators who could discuss longer stretches of the SPS negotiations based on personal 
experience. 
 115. Note the possibility, however, that hegemony in the very definition of norms and terms of 
debate might disguise the exercise of power. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d 
ed. 2004); Robert W. Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, 12 
MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 162 (1983). 
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environmental regulatory protection, gained prominence in the U.S. position on 
SPS issues and led to some late changes in the text of the Agreement.116 This 
finding supports a liberal political-economy perspective that emphasizes the 
diversity of interests and the differential (and possibly changing) power of 
various interested groups within countries rather than assuming a unitary 
national interest. 
The expectations of liberal theories of International Relations are also 
supported insofar as a preference for cooperation via harmonization of 
standards was adopted on the basis of cost-benefit analyses. To be sure, the 
claim that harmonization was the “only feasible way” to achieve the agreed-
upon objective of reducing the trade-inhibiting effect of SPS measures does not 
in itself prove that cost-benefit analyses of this and other means had been 
conducted and were underpinning the stated preference. Yet the October 1988 
intervention, pointing out that alternative means to establish the agreed goals 
existed and had been insufficiently discussed in the full committee, shows that 
such alternatives were clearly recognized and had at least implicitly been 
rejected by the negotiators.117 It is clear from the interviews with negotiators, 
moreover, that alternatives to international harmonization and privileging of 
international standards were considered within each of the delegations of the 
major (SPS) negotiating parties—and consciously rejected based on the 
practical difficulties and political costs that such alternatives would entail. 
Specifically, restricting the SPS Agreement to general principles (such as a 
requirement that every member state would have to be able to provide a 
scientific risk assessment for any SPS measure, if such a measure were 
challenged under the WTO) was rejected because negotiators expected that it 
would either produce deadlock, if unanimity were required to reach agreement 
on risk assessments once a specific dispute had arisen, or overburden the new 
dispute-settlement procedure of the WTO.118 Moreover, small and developing 
countries successfully opposed such general principles, which would have put 
them at a disadvantage. Many of these countries had begun to adopt U.S., EC, 
or international standards but lacked both the research facilities to provide 
scientific evidence in support of such standards and the data originally 
underpinning these standards, as they had not themselves developed them.119 
Developing countries’ SPS measures would thus have always been at risk of 
being easily challenged. The focus on international standards and the 
presumption of WTO compliance for SPS measures based on these standards 
offered developing countries a way to adopt standards that would be safe from 
 
 116. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 19, 2007; July 30, 2007). Those last-minute changes 
concerned, in particular, Annex C. They affected none of the provisions analyzed in this article. 
 117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The negotiator is not identified in the document. 
 118. Not-for-attribution interviews (July 18, 2007; July 30, 2007). 
 119. See GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Eighth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers at 3, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/24 (July 2, 1990). 
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challenges that they could not meet—and it created opportunities for technical 
learning from involvement in the international standardization processes. 
In sum, I find that SPS negotiators in the agriculture group early on reached 
the decision to institutionalize international cooperation on SPS standards by 
making a commitment to harmonize SPS measures on the basis of international 
standards. International standards thus attained the privileged position codified 
in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, which declares national SPS measures based 
on such standards to be categorically in compliance with a country’s obligations 
under the WTO Treaty.120 The U.S. and EC negotiators took the lead in moving 
the negotiations toward agreement on this issue, but the decision was taken 
virtually unanimously, with broad support from developing countries, contrary 
to Realist expectations. The breadth of support was partly a function of the 
widely shared assessment that harmonization and endorsement of international 
standards was more efficient than alternative ways of achieving the objective—
agreed in principle in advance of the Uruguay Round—to reduce the 
unnecessarily trade-impeding effect of SPS-related health and safety regulations 
(and impede the abuse of such regulations as nontariff barriers against trade in 
agricultural goods). These findings, along with the occasionally important 
conflicts of interest within the negotiating parties, are consistent with the 
expectations derived from the liberal political-economy tradition in 
International Relations. At the same time, international consensus also appears 
to have been facilitated by the widespread perception of international 
harmonization of SPS standards as an inherently legitimate means for 
overcoming national differences in health and safety standards, lending some 
support to a constructivist or sociological institutionalist perspective. 
D. Negotiating Delegation 
Agreeing on international cooperation did not yet entail an agreement to 
delegate. In fact, many countries at various times took the position that the 
Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers 
(WGSP) should negotiate a list of specific, existing standards, which all 
members of the Group considered unproblematic and which would then be 
recognized as international standards for purposes of this agreement. A U.S. 
proposal from October 1989, for instance, suggests that specific standards (from 
the CAC, OIE, and IPPC) should be recognized as “deemed to be based on 
sound scientific evidence.”121 Two months later, the EC called for establishing a 
list of standards “which would be deemed to be recognized,”122 and another 
 
 120. SPS Agreement art. 3. 
 121. GATT Secretariat, Submission of the United States on Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural 
Reform, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/118 (Oct. 25, 1989). 
 122. GATT Secretariat, Submission of the European Communities on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Regulations and Measures, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/146 (Dec. 20, 1989). See also GATT Secretariat, 
Communication from the European Communities, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/56 (Apr. 20, 1988), which makes 
it clear that such a list was to be negotiated or agreed within the GATT. 
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three months later, the EC called for a list to be drawn up of “existing 
international and regional standards . . . agreed for use in the GATT context.”123 
This preference for negotiated, retrospective deference to specific standards 
developed by international bodies outside the GATT—rather than prospective 
delegation of SPS standards-setting authority to such bodies—is expressed in 
several documents by various parties throughout 1989. However, it does not 
appear to have correlated systematically with the distribution of power. The 
U.S. communication of July 10, 1989, for instance, calls for a system of 
retrospective designation of SPS standards as international standards,124 whereas 
other U.S. proposals (previously and subsequently) endorse prospective 
delegation. “Optional” provisions in the draft agreement texts of May, July, 
October, and November 1990 (indicating issues on which consensus had not yet 
been achieved) included a provision for a specific list of recognized 
international SPS standards.125 
The issue was not trivial. The supposedly neutral, scientific “risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations,”126 for 
instance, existed only in very rudimentary form. Similarly, food and plant-
health standards did not exist or were badly out of date for many widely traded 
agricultural goods.127 Delegating standards-setting thus meant delegating some 
real authority without knowing the regulatory effect even in the near term.128 
What ultimately swayed negotiators in favor of delegation? 
The specific considerations that shaped any given country’s preference for 
delegation are naturally not well documented in the written record of the 
negotiations, but there are—from documents and my interviews with 
negotiators—multiple indications that the benefits of delegation emphasized by 
P-A theory played an important role. Several countries’ representatives, for 
instance, recognized explicitly that delegation would allow them to benefit from 
the expertise of the specialized agent(s). Standards-setting within the GATT 
was ruled out: the GATT negotiators themselves “could not create [SPS] 
 
 123. GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Fifth Meeting of the Working 
Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers at 3, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/13 
(Mar. 19, 1990). 
 124. GATT Secretariat, Communication from the United States on International Scientific 
Organizations, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/98 (July 10, 1989). 
 125. GATT Secretariat, Synoptic Table of Proposals Relating to Key Concepts, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/17/Rev.1 (May 29, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Framework Agreement on 
Agriculture Reform Programme, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170 (July 11, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Draft Text 
for a Decision by Contracting Parties on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures at 16, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/W/26 (Oct. 1, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Draft Text on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures at 10, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7 (Nov. 20, 1990); see also GATT Secretariat, 
The Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers, 
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/6 (Oct. 15, 1990). 
 126. SPS Agreement art. 5.1. 
 127. Not-for-attribution interview (Aug. 2, 2007). 
 128. As noted above, governments retained the right to deviate from international standards, but 
only under certain conditions and subject to challenge via the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. See 
supra Part II.B and text accompanying notes 21–24; see also supra Part II.C and text accompanying 
notes 41–46. 
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standards” given the extensive technical expertise required.129 And regular ex 
post endorsement of new or revised standards by the WTO SPS Committee was 
rejected explicitly as overly cumbersome (or inefficient). 
Efficiency arguments combined with considerations regarding credibility: 
Agricultural exporters sought a credible commitment from importers that the 
latter would not use SPS measures to undo ex post any agricultural trade 
liberalization achieved in the Uruguay Round. This created, in general, a need 
to constrain any such abuse of SPS standards. The delegation of standard-
setting authority to international organizations was seen as the most efficient 
way of achieving such constraints because it promised to create—through a 
political but public process—a clear baseline against which any given country’s 
standards and regulations could be compared, thus facilitating the identification 
of protectionist, national SPS measures and raising the costs of deviations (due 
to the concomitant requirements to notify all new or revised national measures 
and to provide scientific justifications for the use of standards that differ from 
the international ones). Delegation was thus expected to make more credible 
the commitment not to use SPS measures to disguise protectionism. Finally, the 
desire to shift responsibility (and avoid potential blame) clearly played a role. 
There was an explicit recognition that delegation would allow the negotiators to 
focus on general principles, on which agreement would be easier to reach, 
rather than on a list of specific standards,130 thus shifting responsibility for the 
more politically contentious tasks to the designated agents.131 For developing 
countries, delegation of standardization to international organizations promised 
an opportunity to gain access to advanced SPS standards, which they lacked the 
technological and administrative capacity to develop domestically, as well as an 
opportunity to acquire expertise through participation in an open 
standardization process—opportunities afforded by neither the alternative 
arrangements, nor the status quo. 
As noted above, however, delegation also brings costs—here most 
importantly a loss of policy autonomy. An analysis of agent selection is beyond 
the scope of this article, but it is clear from the chronology, as well as the 
documents, that agreeing to delegation was for many countries linked to the 
question of agent selection, since different (possible) agents implied different 
levels of autonomy costs. The kinds of cost-benefit analyses emphasized by 
political-economic theory in the liberal tradition of International Relations 
theory thus played an important role. To be sure, countries may not have 
estimated those costs correctly, as the EC discovered when it lost the WTO 
“Beef Hormones” dispute in 1997, based in large part on the SPS Agreement 
 
 129. E.g., GATT Secretariat, Summary of the Main Points Raised at the Fourteenth Meeting of the 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture at 4, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/103 (Sept. 4, 1989). 
 130. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 19, 2007; Aug. 2, 2007). 
 131. Similarly, the delegation of the SPS negotiations from the Negotiating Group on Agriculture 
(NG5) to the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WGSP) itself seems to have 
been motivated, in part, by the logic of shifting responsibility. 
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and its failure to provide scientific justification for a food standard that was 
more stringent than the pertinent CAC standard. Developing countries, too, 
apparently overestimated their ability to bring about international standards in 
the CAC, OIE, and IPPC that take their interests into account (mostly due to 
the scarcity of technical expertise and sometimes an unwillingness to devote 
their experts’ time to work in multilateral organizations). They also 
underestimated the extent to which the provisions of the agreement created 
costly obligations for them.132 
Note that preferences were a function of real cost-benefit analyses. 
Countries did not simply seek to minimize autonomy costs, as they could have 
done, for instance, by categorically opposing agents that did not have unanimity 
decisionmaking rules or by insisting on ex post GATT approval. Potential losses 
of autonomy were seen as a tradeoff against political gains: since 
interdependence meant that a decision was required at the international level to 
achieve the broader policy objectives, decisionmaking under some kind of 
majority rule was actually considered more desirable than decisionmaking 
under unanimity, especially by the United States and other agricultural 
exporters, who expected the decisions likely to be taken by the majority in 
those organizations, on average to better serve their interests than the status 
quo. The negotiators thus ultimately settled on delegation to the CAC, OIE, 
and IPPC (only), each of which elicited support or at least indifference from the 
United States, the European Community, Japan, the Cairns Group countries, 
and numerous developing countries alike. Other potential agents were opposed 
by one or more of these countries or groups because their recognition as 
sources of international SPS standards for purposes of the SPS Agreement was 
expected to impose too much of an economic or political cost.133 
V 
THE POLITICS OF DELEGATING REGULATORY  
AUTHORITY: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND DANGEROUS DISCOURSES 
The SPS Agreement—an integral part of the 1994 WTO Treaty and hence 
binding on all member states—is a significant departure from a long GATT 
tradition of not interfering with Members’ regulatory policymaking autonomy. 
Through the Agreement, the member states of the WTO have delegated 
 
 132. This point will be further addressed in the conclusion. See infra Part V. Prior to the 1994 WTO 
Treaty, it was quite common in the CAC (and also in the OIE and the regional organizations under the 
IPPC) for a country to let a standard get adopted, even if the country found the standard objectionable 
and would not have wanted to adopt and implement the standard itself. Letting others go ahead with 
establishing the objectionable standard was unproblematic because Codex, OIE, and IPPC standards 
were strictly advisory and not any more tied to market access than any country’s domestic standards. 
This changed with the coming into force of the SPS Agreement, thus imposing policy autonomy costs 
on all WTO member states (regardless of whether they were members or participants of the three 
standards-developing organizations). 
 133. Unanimity is effectively also the default of noncoercive, noninstitutionalized, international 
cooperation, given traditional norms of international diplomacy. 
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regulatory authority to three international bodies that develop sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards; their standards in turn form the technical basis for 
many health and safety regulations. Member states retain the authority to adopt 
health and safety regulations based on SPS standards that are more stringent 
than the international SPS standards developed by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), the World Animal Health Organization (OIE), and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). But diverging from these 
international standards is subject to several constraints and open to challenge 
through the new dispute-settlement mechanism of the WTO, whereas the 
CAC’s, OIE’s, and IPPC’s SPS standards enjoy the legal presumption of WTO 
compliance. Cases decided against powerful WTO Members on the basis of the 
SPS Agreement show that the authority thus delegated is real.134 
This article sought to answer two questions about the Uruguay Round 
negotiations that led to the SPS Agreement. First, what explains international 
cooperation in the realm of SPS standards, which took the form of a 
commitment to harmonization on the basis of “international standards,” 
combined with the legal presumption of compliance with GATT/WTO 
obligations for health and safety regulations that are based on such standards? 
Second, why did the contracting parties delegate standards-setting authority 
and thus case-by-case control over the content of the standards that would be 
recognized as “international standards”? Why did they not instead draw up a 
list of standards from among existing ones (as in some other Uruguay Round 
Agreements) or institutionalize the negotiation of the content of future SPS 
standards within the GATT/WTO? 
In Part III, I derived possible answers to these questions, primarily from the 
liberal (political-economy) tradition in International Relations theory, which, I 
have argued, allows for the richest incorporation of insights from principal–
agent theory into the analysis of world politics. I also derived alternative—
though not always strictly competing—answers from other theoretical 
perspectives: International Relations Realism and constructivism or sociological 
institutionalism. 
Empirically, in a nutshell, I have found that the agreement to institutionalize 
cooperation as the most efficient way to minimize the trade-impeding effects of 
SPS measures was reached in the early stages of the negotiations with near-
universal support from developed and developing countries in the GATT. 
 
 134. Cases that were brought against OECD member states (or the EC) by one or multiple WTO 
member states and lost by the respondent solely or partly on the basis of the SPS Agreement include 
(the country named is always the respondent):  WT/DS245, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Apples; WT/DS18, Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon; WT/DS3, Korea - Measures 
Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agricultural Products; GMO disputes WT/DS291, 292 & 293, 
European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.  
Disputes filed on the basis of the provisions of the SPS Agreement but not yet concluded include 
WT/DS144, United States—Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from 
Canada and WT/DS100, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products. For more 
details, see WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
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Negotiations over whether to delegate took longer and were more contentious, 
in part because the issues of delegation and agent selection were closely 
intertwined. The benefits of delegation identified in the general P-A literature 
played an important part in this case of international delegation of regulatory 
authority, but considerations of the political costs arising from the loss of policy 
autonomy also played a role. The final decision in favor of delegation was 
therefore only made in the context of a comparison of (autonomy) costs and 
benefits of delegation to the Codex, OIE, and IPPC with the costs and benefits 
of delegating to other possible agents, and the costs and benefits of drawing up 
a list of specific standards (that is, not delegating). 
With respect to the broader theoretical debates, I have found that the 
United States and the EC played a key role in all parts of these negotiations, 
which is consistent with the expectations derived from International Relations 
Realism.135 Many of the detailed findings about the process of the negotiations, 
however, cannot be explained by that theoretical tradition, and the thinking 
underpinning the negotiating positions was in part directly contrary to the 
expectations derived from International Relations Realism. Countries differed 
in their preferences from each other and over time, but those differences hardly 
correlated with the international distribution of power. The dominance of 
agricultural export interests in shaping the U.S. negotiating positions, for 
instance, and especially the shift in U.S. preferences after the election of 
November 1992 cannot be explained without an analysis of divergent domestic 
interests and the domestic political institutions that empower some over others 
(subject, in the U.S. case, to the democratic process). Divisions within the EC 
also played a role: The main EC agriculture negotiators, who were more closely 
tied to protectionist agriculture lobbies in the member states than the SPS 
negotiators, lost interest in the SPS negotiations early on and were happy to 
isolate the SPS negotiations in a separate forum of “technical” experts136—what 
P-A theory would call “shifting responsibility.” Domestic and international 
politics thus interacted to bring about the decisions whether to delegate. These 
findings are far more consistent with the expectations derived from the liberal 
tradition in International Relations, which—like Realism—suggests a central 
role for the United States and the EC in the international negotiations, but 
emphasizes the diversity of interests at the domestic level and the central role of 
domestic institutions in aggregating those interests into a national preference 
that is pursued in negotiations. 
Finally, many of the preferences of the EC and developing countries are 
also consistent with the expectations derived from a sociological institutionalist 
or constructivist approach. To be sure, it may be tempting for powerful political 
actors to cloak their exercise of power in the language of legitimacy and 
 
 135. The relatively marginal role of Japan, despite the country’s economic weight and strong 
feelings about agricultural imports, is puzzling but has also been noted for the GATT negotiations 
more broadly. See, e.g., PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 84, at 102–04. 
 136. See generally not-for-attribution interviews. 
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appropriateness. But references to the special legitimacy of international 
(global) standards are equally common in the statements and verbally 
communicated recollections of those who lost out or who were at the time 
considered neutral observers. For instance, EC support for international 
harmonization and delegation appears to have been motivated at least in part 
by a perceived need for consistent (and in that sense appropriate) behavior, 
given prior practices among the EC member states. And developing countries 
commonly associated international standards with multilateralism, which was 
generally viewed favorably, and with international organizations, which enjoyed 
a high degree of legitimacy as such and thus rendered support for international 
standardization the “appropriate” course of action.137 
That said, the SPS negotiations may have been an easy case for arguments 
about norms and legitimacy: there had been a real, prior consensus (consistent 
with material and political cost-benefit analyses) regarding the overall 
objectives of an SPS Agreement, whereas the Punta del Este declaration that 
launched the Uruguay Round had in many other issue areas merely papered 
over deep differences regarding the objectives. Even the text of the actual SPS 
Agreement contains mostly commitments to abstract concepts and principles, 
on which—according to several negotiators—it was both politically and 
practically much easier to agree than on tariff levels or cuts in subsidies, in 
which negotiating positions tended to be diametrically opposed.138 The SPS 
negotiations therefore never broke down, were generally far more cordial than 
the rest of the agriculture negotiations, and were mostly concluded almost four 
years earlier than the Uruguay Round as a whole. It should also be noted that 
even when the negotiators agreed, as predicted by sociological institutionalism, 
 
 137. Note that any particular international organization’s legitimacy is not a fixed, static 
characteristic. For instance, the lack of concern among both U.S. and EC negotiators over the 
possibility of being outvoted in the international organizations (which might diminish policy autonomy 
or could provide cover for protectionist SPS measures) is hard to explain from a political-economy 
perspective, given the majoritarian decisionmaking rules of OIE and CAC. Part of the legitimacy of 
these organizations, which appears to provide a better explanation for the lack of concern, seems to 
have been derived from a perception of these organizations as not being majoritarian, even though 
their rules clearly permitted such decisionmaking. That perception was well justified by CAC practice 
in the pre-WTO period: there was a strong emphasis on reaching consensus, even if it came at the 
expense of the quality or specificity of the standard. See Alan Swinbank, The Role of the WTO and the 
International Agencies in SPS Standard Setting, 15 AGRIBUSINESS 323 (Summer 1999); David G. 
Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 175–215 (1998) 
(chapter in unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Effective Multilateral Regulation of Industrial Activity: 
Institutions for Policing and Adjusting Binding and Nonbinding Legal Commitments, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) (on file with author). As Victor puts it, many Codex standards were therefore 
“modest, vague, or both.” As standards-setting in these organizations has become more contentious 
post-WTO, this procedural legitimacy has surely declined. 
 138. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 62, at 402 (noting that most countries are both 
agricultural exporters and importers). Having a dual role as exporter and importer—or more generally 
facing uncertainty about one's future role—can facilitate compromise, because uncertainty over the 
side of a bargain on which each actor will end up creates incentives to write rules that are fair to both 
sides. (I thank Joseph Grundfest for an earlier discussion of this issue.) Yet SPS negotiators seem to 
have had quite clear expectations of how their respective countries (and the most politically salient 
groups within) would be affected by SPS standards. Not-for-attribution interview (Aug. 2, 2007). 
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they did not necessarily do so for the reasons suggested by some authors in that 
tradition: on many occasions during the negotiations, concerns were raised 
about the objectivity of “science,” and several interviewees noted having 
recognized—maybe not in the beginning, but during the course of the 
negotiations—that science is “not monolithic.”139 
One further issue should be noted. In recent years, many developing 
countries have expressed dismay at the obligations they undertook via the SPS 
Agreement.140 They have found that many international standards to which they 
committed themselves are much more costly to implement or certify than 
expected, and that the standards are allegedly inappropriate in some contexts 
(such as when they reduce scarce food supplies rather than making them more 
secure or healthy).141 At the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, however, 
no developing country appears to have foreseen any of this. As far as I could 
discern, even the usually most vocal guardians of developing countries’ 
interests, such as India and Brazil, registered no opposition to any part of the 
SPS agreement prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.142 Although it 
appears “stunning” in retrospect,143 developing countries appear to have 
accepted what turned out to be very costly obligations for little in return. 
In many respects, this behavior by developing countries is a puzzle for any 
rationalist theoretical framework, such as International Relations liberalism. 
The argument that developing countries lacked the information to understand 
what they were getting themselves into144 raises as many questions as it answers. 
The text of the SPS Agreement was (except for some minor changes in 1993) 
known for almost four years before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and 
draft texts had circulated for many months in 1990. How could practically all 
developing countries have failed to gather the information to assess the 
Agreement?  Büthe and Mattli’s theory of institutional complementarity might 
provide a partial explanation in that most of the negotiators from developing 
countries who attended meetings of the Working Group on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers were officials from ministries of 
agriculture, often at the domestic level institutionally separated from their 
countries’ officials with knowledge of the international standards-setting 
organizations.145 The pervasiveness of developing country ignorance, however, 
suggests another, ideational explanation: The development of what the former 
 
 139. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 15, 2007; Aug. 2, 2007). 
 140. E.g., MUCHKUND DUBEY, AN UNEQUAL TREATY: WORLD TRADING ORDER AFTER GATT 
(1996); Das, supra note 113; Simonetta Zarrilli, WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: Issues for 
Developing Countries, in A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR FUTURE 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 309–38 (UNCTAD ed., 2000). 
 141. Zarrilli, supra note 140, at 310, 321, 324. 
 142. See also Mark Axelrod, Saving Institutional Benefits: Path Dependence in International Law 
(2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with author). 
 143. Not-for-attribution interviews (June 19, 2007; Aug. 2, 2007). 
 144. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO, at 47f (2006). 
 145. See, e.g., Mattli & Büthe, supra note 41; see also Das, supra, note 113, ¶ 57. 
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Indian ambassador to the GATT in retrospect called “a rational negotiating 
strategy”146 appears to have been impeded not just by the normatively favorable 
association of international standards with multilateralism and international 
organizations, but also by the predominant focus on special treatment and 
financial and technical assistance for developing countries in “development” 
discourses. 
Developing countries concentrated almost all of their energies during the 
SPS negotiations on getting vague commitments to this “development” agenda 
and vague promises of assistance (in Articles 9 and 10 of the Agreement).147 
Such primary emphasis on short-term (technical and financial) assistance over 
the long-term effects is consistent with liberal International Relations theory’s 
emphasis on the distinction between the government and (a variety of) societal 
interests insofar as the benefits of such assistance accrue predominantly to 
current governments while the long-term costs are borne by a broader segment 
of the population. Yet there is little indication of any variation among 
developing countries in this respect (as a domestic-politics explanation would 
lead us to expect). Ideas, norms, and discourses mattered indeed, but ironically, 
it was developing countries’ own development discourses that worked to their 
detriment: obsessed with the inclusion of provisions for short-term exceptions 
and development assistance, which were always peripheral to the long-term 
legal and regulatory obligations in the Agreement, developing countries mostly 
failed to conduct meaningful cost-benefit analyses of these obligations. 
 
 146. Das, supra note 113, ¶ 37. 
 147. Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru, for instance, made formal submissions that sought to tie 
international harmonization to technical and development assistance for developing countries. 
